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  the	  Manifestation	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  Crispin	  Wright	  
I	  
MacFarlane’s	  core	  project	  in	  his	  deep-­‐reaching,	  superbly	  crafted	  book	  is	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  theoretically	  respectable,	  interesting,	  useful	  species	  of	  relativism	  about	  truth—the	  species	  he	  captions	  by	  the	  term,	  assessment-­‐sensitivity.	  	  Assessment-­‐sensitivity	  contrasts,	  however,	  with	  classic	  truth	  relativism—	  if	  indeed	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing—	  in	  three	  important	  respects.	  First,	  it	  is	  potentially	  a	  local	  feature	  of	  discourses.	  	  MacFarlane,	  unlike	  Protagoras,	  is	  making	  no	  general	  claim	  about	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  truth.	  So	  he	  finesses	  a	  broad	  sweep	  of	  traditional	  concerns	  about	  the	  coherence	  of	  truth-­‐relativism,	  from	  the	  Theaetetus	  onwards,	  which	  take	  it	  to	  be	  a	  global	  thesis,	  (so	  hence,	  e.g.,	  self-­‐applicable.)	  Second,	  whereas	  traditional	  relative	  truth	  is	  a	  property	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  attitudes,	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  is	  a	  characteristic	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  token	  assertoric	  utterances	  —	  though	  MacFarlane	  allows	  it	  to	  apply	  derivatively	  to	  the	  propositions	  expressed	  thereby	  (which	  he	  understands	  in	  the	  usual	  intuitive	  way	  as	  what	  are	  asserted,	  what	  are	  believed,	  what	  sustain	  relations	  of	  incompatibility	  and	  entailment,	  and	  so	  on.1)	  Finally,	  MacFarlane's	  project	  is	  harnessed	  to	  the	  task	  of	  giving	  descriptively	  adequate	  semantic	  theories	  for	  certain	  regions	  of	  discourse	  as	  actually	  practiced,	  rather	  than,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  to	  any	  specifically	  metaphysical	  controversies.	  Traditionally,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  Assessment-­‐Sensitivity	  p.	  49	  and	  following.	  Unless	  otherwise	  stated,	  all	  references	  below	  are	  to	  MacFarlane’s	  book.	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truth-­‐relativism	  is	  a	  player	  in	  the	  normative	  debates	  about	  realism	  and	  objectivity,	  one	  kind	  of	  paradigm	  of	  anti-­‐realism,	  alongside	  and	  contrasting	  with	  non-­‐cognitivism,	  error-­‐theory,	  expressivism	  and	  the	  rest,	  —and	  indeed	  a	  paradigm	  that	  in	  the	  modern	  (20th	  century)	  debates	  was	  largely	  discarded.	  MacFarlane,	  as	  it	  appears,	  intends	  no	  direct	  contribution	  to	  those	  debates.	  	   The	  interest	  of	  MacFarlane's	  thesis	  is	  nevertheless	  unquestionable.	  The	  remarks	  to	  follow	  will	  bear	  on	  the	  theoretical	  respectability,	  broadly	  conceived,	  of	  truth-­‐relativism	  as	  he	  develops	  it,	  and	  —indirectly—on	  its	  utility.	  
II	  A	  class	  of	  utterances	  is	  assessment	  sensitive	  if	  and	  only	  if,	  for	  each	  member	  U	  of	  that	  class,	  the	  question	  whether	  an	  assertor	  of	  U	  speaks	  truly	  turns	  not	  merely	  on	  the	  circumstances	  obtaining	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  assertion	  but	  depends	  additionally	  on	  aspects	  of	  a	  'context	  of	  assessment':	  perhaps	  the	  information	  state,	  or	  interests,	  of	  an	  assessor,	  or	  her	  moral	  standards,	  or	  tastes,	  or	  just	  the	  time	  of	  assessment.	  A	  single	  such	  utterance	  may	  thus	  receive	  variable	  but	  nevertheless	  correct	  assessments	  of	  truth-­‐value,	  depending	  on	  the	  variable	  characteristics,	  broadly	  conceived,	  —‘parameters’—of	  assessors	  of	  it.	  There	  is	  no	  once-­‐and-­‐for-­‐all	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  assertor	  of	  U	  spoke	  truly,	  even	  after	  the	  content	  and	  circumstances	  of	  the	  assertion	  are	  fully	  determined.	  Thus	  the	  truth-­‐conditions	  for	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  utterances	  involve	  a	  double	  relativity:	  U	  is	  true	  (or	  not)	  as	  uttered	  in	  C1—	  the	  context	  of	  use,	  serving	  to	  fix	  the	  content	  expressed	  by	  U	  (as	  well,	  perhaps,	  as	  other	  relevant	  features	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  evaluation)—	  and	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assessed	  in	  C2—	  the	  context	  of	  assessment,	  serving	  to	  fix	  the	  values	  of	  the	  relevant	  parameters	  of	  assessment.2	  	  	   Now,	   if	  a	  semantic	  theory	  that	  centralises	  such	  an	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  notion	  of	  truth	  is	  to	  prove	  descriptively	  superior,	  we	  need	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  how	  the	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	   of	   a	   class	   of	   utterances	   might	   be	   distinctively	   manifest	   in	   the	   discourse	  concerned.	  What	   is	  wanted,	  at	   first	  blush,	   is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  a	  pair	  of	  assessors	  who	  diverge	  in	  their	  assessments	  of	  an	  utterance	  U,	  one	  regarding	  it	  as	  true	  and	  the	  other	  as	  false,	   can	   both	   be	   not	   merely	   justified	   but	   correct—	   and	   this	   purely	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	  satisfaction	   of	   different	   relevant	   parameters	   of	   assessment.	   How	   might	   that	   highly	  theoretical-­‐sounding	  circumstance	  show	  in	  linguistic	  practice?	  	   I	  think	  this	  matter	  has	  always	  been	  problematic,	  and	  my	  principal	  point	  here	  will	  be	  that	  it	  remains	  so.	  Of	  course	  there	  would	  be	  no	  problem	  if	  we	  could	  just	  assume	  that	  each	   speaker	   X	   has	   the	   resource	   in	   the	   object	   language	   of	   a	   correctness	   predicate,	  contrasted	   with	   all	   three	   of	   (absolute)	   truth,	   truth	   as	   assessed	   by	   X,	   and	   epistemic	  justifiability	   in	   the	  object	   language.	   In	   that	   case	  X	   can	  simply	   say	   that	  Y’s	   assessment	   is	  correct,	   even	   though	   false	   (as	   assessed	  by	  X),	   and	  even	   though	  X	  does	  not	  mean	   to	   say	  (merely)	   that	   Y’s	   assessment	   is	   fully	   (epistemically)	   justified	   in	   Y’s	   situation.	   But	   the	  theorist	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  cannot	  simply	  assume	  that	  such	  resources	  are	  in	  play.	  We	   are	   asking	   after	   the	   pre-­‐theoretic	   manifestation	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   discourse	   is	  assessment-­‐sensitive:	  we	  want	  to	  be	  told	  about	  patterns	  of	  use	  that	  will	  display	  that	  fact	  even	  if	  the	  only	  alethic	  predicate	  in	  currency	  in	  the	  discourse	  itself	  is	  the	  unreconstructed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  extension	  of	  this	  idea	  to	  propositions	  is	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  4.	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“true”.	   	   The	   task	   is	   to	   give	   sense	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   semantic	   theory	   featuring	   an	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  notion	  of	  truth	  has	  genuine,	  distinctive	  operational	  content.	  
III	  MacFarlane	  himself	  is	  very	  respectful	  of	  the	  manifestation-­‐challenge.	  His	  response	  to	  it	  is	  fashioned	   in	   reaction	   to	   another	   type	   of	   proposal	   that	   comes	   into	   focus	   in	   his	  framework—	  one,	  indeed,	  which	  may	  seem	  to	  chime	  better	  with	  certain	  folk	  ideas	  about	  relativism	   than	   MacFarlane’s	   own.	   Suppose	   Tim	   affirms,	   correctly	   by	   his	   taste,	   that	  stewed	   rhubarb	   is	   delicious,	   and	   Paul	   affirms,	   correctly	   by	   his	   taste,	   the	   contrary.	   And	  suppose	   I	   want	   to	   say,	   even-­‐handedly,	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   an	   intuitive	   relativism,	   that	  neither	   is	   making	   any	   kind	   of	   mistake.	   (Their	   disagreement	   is	   “faultless”.)	   That	   is	  something	   it	   seems	   I	   cannot	   say	   if	   utterances	   of	   "Stewed	   rhubarb	   is	   delicious"	   are	  assessment-­‐sensitive,	   since	   then	   I	   will	   have	   to	   assess	   both	   claims	   by	   my	   taste,	   and	  whatever	  that	  may	  be,	  it	  cannot	  sustain	  both	  Tim’s	  and	  Paul’s	  verdicts.	  Suppose	  therefore	  that	  we	  retain	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  such	  assertions	  is	  standards-­‐of-­‐taste-­‐relative	  but	  stipulate	   instead	   that	   the	  standards	  by	  which	   they	  are	   to	  be	  assessed	  are	   those	  of	   their	  
authors.	  The	  proposal	  is,	  in	  effect,	  that	  C1	  and	  C2	  are	  to	  coincide:	  the	  context	  of	  assessment	  is	  to	  be	  the	  context	  of	  use.	  	  Then	  now	  I	  can	  say	  that	  both	  Paul	  and	  Tim	  speak	  truly.	  	  	   This	  proposal	  is	  what	  MacFarlane	  calls	  non-­‐indexical	  contextualism.3	  Non-­‐indexical	  contextualism	  may	  seem	  at	  first	  glance	  like	  a	  pretty	  decent	  approximation	  to	  Everyman's	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “Non-­‐indexical”	  indicates	  that	  the	  view	  does	  not	  postulate	  that	  the	  propositional	  content	  of	  “Rhubarb	  is	  delicious”,	  e.g.,	  varies	  as	  a	  function	  of	  variation	  in	  parameters—here,	  standards	  of	  taste—in	  Tim’s	  and	  Paul’s	  respective	  contexts	  of	  use.	  	  What	  Tim	  affirms	  is	  what	  Paul	  denies.	  But	  the	  view	  is	  contextualist	  in	  granting	  that	  the	  truth-­‐value	  of	  the	  proposition	  concerned	  is	  variable	  with	  parameters	  set	  by	  context	  of	  use.	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notion	   of	   relativism.	   (It	   allows	   that	   there	   is	   “your	   truth”	   and	   “my	   truth”.)	   MacFarlane	  scorns	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  a	  view	  is	  properly	  relativist,	  primarily	  on	  the	  ground	  that,	  unlike	  assessment–sensitivity,	   it	   assigns	   once-­‐and-­‐for-­‐all	   truth-­‐values	   to	   Paul's	   and	   Tim’s	  utterances.	   That	   reflection,	   notably,	   misses	   the	   point	   that	   if	   Paul	   insincerely	   but	  obsequiously	  defers	  to	  Tim,	  one	  and	  the	  same	  proposition	  will	  be	  false	  in	  his	  mouth	  but	  true	   in	   Tim’s.	   The	   reader	  may	   think	   that	   is	   relativism	   enough	   to	   fulfil	   the	   Protagorean	  spirit.	  	  	   Perhaps	  it	  is	  pointless	  to	  debate	  further	  which	  view	  has	  the	  better	  title	  to	  the	  term,	  "relativism”.	   What	   is	   significant	   for	   MacFarlane’s	   purposes	   is	   that	   non-­‐indexical	  contextualism	  and	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  potentially	  diverge	   in	   their	  predictions	  of	  use.	  For	  suppose	  I	  assert	  U	  and	  then	  later	  have	  occasion	  to	  re-­‐visit	  the	  question	  of	  the	  truth-­‐value	   of	   my	   former	   utterance	   of	   it:	   non-­‐indexical	   contextualism	   bids	   me	   defer	   to	   the	  standards	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  utterance	  was	  originally	  made,	  and	  if	  it	  was	  correct	  by	  those	  standards,	  —	  let’s	  suppose	  it	  was,	  —	  I	  should	  now	  regard	  my	  assertion	  as	  having	  been	  made	  truly,	  whatever	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  context	  that	  I	  now	  occupy.	  Assessment-­‐sensitivity,	   by	   contrast,	   will	   have	  me	   assess	  my	   earlier	   utterance	   of	   U	   precisely	   by	   the	  standards	  of	  my	  present	  context	  and	  I	  may	  thus	  be	  led	  to	  regard	  my	  assertion	  as	  having	  been	  made	  falsely,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  correct	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  its	  original	  context.	  	  
IV	  This	  contrast	  is	  key	  to	  MacFarlane’s	  response	  to	  the	  manifestation-­‐challenge.	  He	  approaches	  the	  matter	  via	  a	  remark	  of	  Michael	  Dummett	  in	  the	  latter’s	  paper,	  “Truth”,	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  the	  notion	  of	  truth,	  it	  is	  necessary	  not	  merely	  to	  know	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under	  what	  circumstances	  sentences	  are	  true,	  but	  also	  to	  understand	  the	  connection	  between	  their	  truth	  and	  the	  proprieties	  of	  their	  assertion.	  4	  MacFarlane	  casts	  this	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  assertion	  is	  constitutively	  governed	  by	  the	  following	  
Truth	  Rule:	  	   At	  a	  context	  C,	  assert	  that	  P	  only	  if	  P	  is	  true	  at	  C.	  5	  
We	  presumably	  know	  well	  enough	  what	  it	  is	  for	  speakers	  to	  manage	  their	  linguistic	  practice	  in	  conformity	  to	  the	  Truth	  Rule.	  Correspondingly,	  it	  ought	  to	  suffice	  to	  allay	  qualms	  about	  the	  theoretical	  respectability	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  truth	  to	  formulate	  a	  corresponding	  rule	  for	  it—a	  rule	  such	  that	  it	  is	  clear	  what	  it	  would	  be	  to	  manage	  a	  relevant	  linguistic	  practice	  in	  conformity	  to	  it	  —and	  maybe	  thereby	  to	  show	  what	  would	  be	  for	  practitioners	  to	  have	  implicit	  grasp	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  truth.6	  	   MacFarlane,	  however,	  fails	  to	  find	  any	  suitable	  such	  rule	  distinctive	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  truth.	  He	  discusses	  various	  options	  and	  finds	  all	  wanting,7	  with	  the	  best	  candidate	  being:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Page	  98	  and	  following.	  	  5	  Page	  101.	  In	  speaking	  of	  this	  rule	  as	  constitutive,	  MacFarlane	  intends,	  I	  imagine,	  not	  that	  an	  utterance	  is	  an	  assertion	  if	  and	  only	  if	  compliant	  with	  it,	  nor	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  utterer	  intends	  so	  to	  comply,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  assertion	  to	  be	  
answerable	  to	  it	  —	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  negative	  appraisal,	  just	  on	  that	  account,	  if	  in	  breach	  of	  it.	  Cf.	  note	  7	  on	  page	  101.	  6	  This,	  to	  be	  sure,	  will	  only	  address	  the	  question	  of	  theoretical	  respectability	  narrowly	  conceived:	  the	  question	  of	  giving	  sense	  to	  the	  theoretical	  primitive.	  The	  broader	  project	  is	  that	  of	  rendering	  fully	  intelligible	  a	  practice	  for	  whose	  description	  the	  notion	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  is	  needed.	  For	  this,	  the	  relativist	  needs	  not	  merely	  to	  characterise	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  practice	  in	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  would	  be	  distinctively	  manifest	  but	  to	  show	  how	  such	  a	  practice	  could	  be	  rational	  and	  useful.	  MacFarlane	  encroaches	  on	  this	  vital	  task	  in	  chapter	  12	  —	  but	  I	  have	  no	  space	  to	  consider	  his	  suggestions	  here.	  7	  Pages	  103-­‐4.	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Reflexive	  Truth	  Rule	  	  	  An	  agent	  is	  permitted	  to	  assert	  that	  P	  at	  context	  C1	  only	  if	  P	  is	  true	  as	  used	  at	  C1	  and	  assessed	  from	  C1	  —	  and	  the	  evident	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  since	  it	  identifies	  the	  contexts	  of	  use	  and	  assessment,	  it	  predicts	  nothing	  that	  is	  not	  predicted	  by	  non-­‐indexical	  contextualism.	  In	  fact	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  no	  rules	  for	  assertion	  alone	  can	  do	  what’s	  wanted,	  since	  rules	  for	  assertion—	  at	  least,	  rules	  which	  agents	  can	  effectively	  follow—	  have	  to	  relate	  to	  features	  of	  prospective	  contexts	  of	  use,	  and	  so	  can	  make	  no	  room	  for	  an	  active	  contrast	  between	  context	  of	  use	  and	  context	  of	  assessment.	  	   MacFarlane’s	  solution	  is	  to	  invoke	  the	  idea	  of	  retraction.	  The	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  of	  an	  utterance	  will	  show,	  MacFarlane	  contends,	  in	  its	  being	  constitutively	  subject	  to	  a	  norm	  of	  retraction	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  
Retraction	  Rule.	  	   An	  agent	  in	  context	  C2	  is	  required	  to	  retract	  an	  (unretracted)	  assertion	  of	  P	  made	  at	  C1	  if	  P	  is	  not	  true	  as	  used	  at	  C1	  and	  assessed	  from	  C2	  	  Non-­‐indexical	  contextualism	  need	  have	  no	  quarrel	  with	  the	  Retraction	  Rule	  as	  such.	  	  But,	  unlike	  assessment-­‐sensitivity,	  it	  will	  require	  an	  assessor	  at	  C2	  to	  return	  the	  same	  verdict	  as	  a	  correct	  assessment	  from	  the	  standpoint	  at	  C1	  and	  so	  will	  mandate	  retraction	  only	  if	  the	  assertion	  was	  not	  correct	  by	  the	  lights	  of	  the	  latter.	  So	  the	  two	  views	  will	  thus	  potentially	  diverge	  in	  their	  predictions	  of	  retraction.	  
V	  
	  Retraction	  phenomena	  are	  thus	  a	  crucial	  component	  in	  the	  empirical	  distinguishability	  of	  MacFarlane's	   proposal	   from	   non-­‐indexical	   contextualism.	   They	   are	   also	   key	   to	  MacFarlane's	   main	   strategy	   of	   argument	   against	   regular—indexical—contextualism.	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Regular	  contextualists	  about	  “knows”,	  for	  example,	  make	  much	  of	  the	  apparent	  variation	  in	   the	   assertibility	   of	   knowledge	   ascriptions	   in	   the	   light	   of	   switches	   between	   so-­‐called	  "low"	  and	  "high"	  contexts.	  However	  when,	  in	  the	  scepticism	  seminar,	  I	  decline	  to	  ascribe	  knowledge	  to	  a	  subject—	  say,	  myself—	  to	  which	  earlier	  over	  breakfast	  I	  laid	  claim,	  I	  will	  characteristically	  deny	  that	  I	  spoke	  truly	  in	  making	  that	  claim,	  saying	  things	  like	  “I	  realise	  now	   that	   I	   didn’t	   know	   anything	   of	   the	   kind”.	   Yet	   on	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   standards-­‐contextualism	   about	   “knows”	  —	  whether	   indexical	   or	   non-­‐indexical—	   can	   explain	   only	  my	  denial	  that	  I	  know	  now;	  it	  should	  predict	  no	  quarrel	  with	  what	  I	  said	  earlier,	  since	  the	  relevant	   form	   of	   words	   has	   undergone	   a	   shift	   in	   content	   with	   the	   tightening	   of	   the	  standards.8	  It	  is	  similar	  with	  epistemic	  “mights”	  and	  “coulds”.	  High	  up	  on	  the	  Cuillin	  ridge	  during	  a	  misty	  scramble,	  a	  large	  peak	  briefly	  looms	  into	  view	  seemingly	  just	  a	  short	  way	  ahead.	   "That	   could	  be	   the	  summit",	   you	  encouragingly	   say.	  Later,	  warming	  your	   feet	  by	  the	   fire	  and	  poring	  over	   the	  map,	  you	  say,	   "You	  know,	   I	  was	  wrong.	  That	  peak	  couldn't	  have	  been	  the	  summit.	  It’s	  not	  visible	  from	  where	  we	  were	  standing.”	  That	  seems	  like	  an	  acceptable	  piece	  of	  conversation,	  in	  which	  you	  correct—retract—	  an	  earlier	  claim	  which,	  we	  can	  suppose,	  was	  proper	  enough	   in	   the	  original	  context	  of	  use.	  For	  MacFarlane,	   it	   is	  the	  task	  of	  accounting	  for	  data	  of	  correction	  and	  retraction	  of	  this	  kind	  that	  provides	  the	  principal	   raison	   d'être	   for	   relativism.	   Since	   no	   form	   of	   contextualism	   can,	   apparently,	  account	  for	  such	  data,	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  is	  the	  superior	  theory.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  That	  I	  regard	  my	  former	  assertion	  as	  false	  is	  the	  crucial	  point	  in	  this	  instance;	  in	  view	  of	  the	  factivity	  of	  all	  (serious)	  uses	  of	  “knows”,	  contextualism	  can	  of	  course	  predict	  that	  I	  will	  no	  longer	  wish	  to	  endorse	  the	  truth	  of	  my	  earlier	  utterance.	  What	  it	  seems	  it	  cannot	  predict	  is	  my	  denial	  that	  what	  I	  said	  is	  true.	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VI	  
Does	  this	  address	  the	  manifestation-­‐challenge?	  	  Let	  us	  grant	  that	  if	  the	  issue	  was	  only	  whether	  we	  should	  prefer	  a	  (regular)	  contextualist	  or	  an	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  relativist	  account	  of	  a	  given	  region	  of	  discourse,	  then	  differences	  in	  retraction	  behaviour	  may	  well	  favour	  the	  latter.	  	  Caution	  is,	  admittedly,	  needed	  with	  the	  point,	  for	  it	  depends	  on	  how	  exactly	  the	  notion	  of	  retraction	  is	  understood	  and	  how	  it	  in	  turn	  is	  manifest	  in	  linguistic	  practice.	  Generally,	  MacFarlane	  characterises	  retraction	  as	  an	  operation	  on	  speech-­‐acts:	  it	  is	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  an	  assertion,	  comparable	  to	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  question,	  the	  cancellation	  of	  a	  command,	  or	  the	  revoking	  of	  a	  promise.9	  	  There	  is	  an	  issue,	  which	  I	  cannot	  adequately	  enter	  into	  here,	  about	  whether	  this	  notion	  of	  retraction—contrast:	  
denial	  of	  the	  former	  assertion—	  will	  underwrite	  the	  problem	  MacFarlane	  thinks	  it	  makes	  for	  contextualism	  in	  all	  the	  relevant	  cases.	  Generally,	  one	  will	  regard	  a	  previous	  assertion	  as	  retractable	  in	  this	  milder	  sense	  whenever	  considerations	  emerge	  which	  undermine10	  the	  original	  grounds	  for	  it—	  and	  this	  is	  so	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  content	  of	  the	  utterance	  in	  question	  was	  sensitive	  the	  context	  of	  use.	  The	  consequent	  worry	  is	  that	  some	  at	  least	  of	  the	  retraction	  patterns	  that	  seem	  characteristic	  of	  our	  use	  of	  e.g.	  epistemic	  modals	  may	  accordingly	  be	  readily	  explicable	  by	  contextualism.	  This	  is	  plausibly	  so,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  Cuillin	  peak	  example:	  the	  evidential	  relevance	  of	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  false	  summit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  	  Page	  108.	  	  10	  	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  the	  usual	  contrast	  between	  undermining	  and	  overriding	  defeaters.	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through	  the	  mist	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  later	  information	  that	  the	  relevant	  peak	  was	  not	  visible	  from	  that	  location.11	  	   However	  whether	  the	  intuitions	  that	  MacFarlane	  tries	  to	  excite	  concerning	  retractions	  in	  some	  of	  his	  case	  studies	  really	  do	  provide	  for	  crucial	  experiments	  between	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  and	  contextualism	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  I	  can	  take	  further	  here.	  The	  issue	  I	  wish	  to	  press	  is	  whether	  enough	  has	  been	  done	  to	  have	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  truth	  make	  clear	  theoretical	  sense	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  MacFarlane	  writes	  that	  “What	  makes	  the	  relative	  truth	  intelligible	  is	  the	  potential	  difference	  between	  the	  context	  at	  which	  an	  assertion	  is	  made	  and	  the	  contexts	  at	  which	  challenges	  to	  it	  will	  have	  to	  be	  met	  and	  retractions	  considered."12	  But	  he	  knows	  very	  well	  that	  only	  that	  much	  does	  not	  make	  relative	  truth	  intelligible,	  since	  that	  potential	  difference	  will	  engage	  any	  non-­‐relativistic	  discourse	  where	  shifting	  evidential	  states	  can	  mandate	  the	  retraction	  of	  previously	  warranted	  claims.	  	  	   If	  we	  are	  already	  persuaded	  of	  the	  intelligibility	  of	  relative	  truth,	  we	  can	  characterise	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  case	  like	  this:	  when	  new	  evidence	  comes	  in	  that	  potentially	  mandates	  retraction	  of	  a	  non-­‐relativistic	  assertion	  that	  was	  warranted	  in	  its	  original	  context,	  the	  justifiability	  of	  the	  retraction	  will	  require	  grounds	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  original	  warrant	  was	  misleading.	  In	  a	  relativistic	  case,	  however,	  so	  one	  would	  suppose,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  such	  requirement.	  That	  is:	  if	  a	  practice	  is	  to	  distinctively	  manifest	  a	  relativistic	  character,	  then	  something	  about	  the	  way	  that	  retraction	  of	  an	  assertion	  is	  done	  will	  need	  to	  evince	  not	  merely	  that	  the	  assertion	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Contrast	  the	  Chainsaw	  example	  in	  Wright	  (2007)	  	  12	  Page	  116.	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acknowledged	  to	  have	  been	  fully	  justified	  its	  original	  context,	  but	  that	  there	  need	  have	  been	  nothing	  misleading	  about	  the	  support	  it	  then	  had	  –	  that	  it	  was,	  as	  it	  were,	  alethically	  
faultless	  back	  in	  that	  context.	  But	  the	  question	  we	  keep	  coming	  back	  to	  is:	  how	  might	  ordinary	  object-­‐level	  practice	  manifest	  that	  element?	  	   My	  sense	  is	  that	  MacFarlane	  underestimates	  the	  difficulties	  that	  his	  proposal	  encounters	  at	  this	  point	  because	  he	  envisions	  a	  theoretical	  landscape	  in	  which	  there	  are	  essentially	  just	  three	  players:	  assessment-­‐sensitivity,	  one	  or	  another	  form	  of	  contextualism,	  and	  invariantist	  realism.	  The	  latter	  will	  expectably	  also	  predict	  the	  patterns	  of	  retraction	  behaviour	  that	  McFarland	  believes	  favour	  assessment-­‐sensitivity.	  The	  reason	  why	  he	  thinks	  that	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  is	  prioritised	  by	  retraction	  phenomena	  is	  because	  he	  has	  already	  discounted	  realism	  in	  the	  relevant	  cases.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  metaphysical	  lemma	  required	  by	  his	  strategy	  of	  argument.	  	   It	  may	  be	  rejoined	  that,	  for	  the	  relevant	  range	  of	  cases,	  that	  is	  surely	  a	  point	  of	  no	  great	  moment.	  There	  is	  no	  major	  metaphysical	  hostage	  involved,	  surely,	  in	  the	  rejection	  of	  realism	  about	  basic	  taste,	  comedy,	  or	  epistemic	  possibility	  (though	  the	  issue	  is	  of	  course	  much	  more	  controversial	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge.)	  The	  real	  concern,	  though,	  is	  not	  about	  the	  warrant	  for	  discounting	  a	  third	  possibility—realism—	  but	  about	  that	  for	  discounting	  a	  fourth:	  minimalism.	  	   I	  can	  here	  offer	  only	  the	  briefest	  outline	  of	  this	  direction.	  For	  the	  minimalist,	  the	  object-­‐language	  truth-­‐predicate	  that	  features	  in	  the	  	  discourses	  in	  which	  we	  are	  interested	  is,	  more	  or	  less,	  a	  deflationary—merely	  disquotational—truth-­‐predicate.	  And	  with	  that,	  as	  he	  notes,	  MacFarlane	  can	  agree.13	  But	  minimalism	  rejects	  the	  idea	  that	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Pages	  38-­‐9	  and	  93-­‐4.	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special	  notion	  of	  truth	  is	  required	  in	  framing	  a	  semantic	  theory	  for	  these	  discourses.	  With	  that,	  again,	  MacFarlane	  can	  agree	  provided	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  theorist	  is	  merely	  in	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  semantic	  composition.	  But	  if	  the	  project	  is	  to	  recover	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  (diachronic)	  patterns	  of	  assent	  and	  dissent,	  MacFarlane	  will	  disagree;	  it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  invocation	  of	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  is	  supposed	  to	  come	  into	  its	  own.	  	  Minimalism	  disputes	  that.	  	  For	  the	  minimalist,	  	  understanding	  the	  practice	  of	  these	  discourses	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  understanding	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  their	  signature	  statements	  may	  be	  asserted,	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  such	  assertions	  are	  defeated	  and	  should	  be	  withdrawn	  or	  denied.	  	  The	  former	  are	  typically	  subjective	  states:	  states	  of	  information,	  	  or	  various	  kinds	  of	  affective	  state.	  	  The	  defeaters	  are	  various	  and	  variously	  topic-­‐specific	  but,	  to	  illustrate	  for	  the	  case	  of	  taste,	  will	  include	  evidence	  of	  impairment	  of	  appropriate	  capacities	  (You	  just	  cleaned	  your	  teeth,	  	  or	  are	  still	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  dental	  anaesthesia),	  	  evidence	  of	  lack	  of	  community	  (“No-­‐one	  but	  you	  likes	  that	  stuff”),	  	  overriders	  drawing	  on	  superordinate	  values	  (“Do	  you	  have	  any	  idea	  how	  they	  treat	  the	  geese?”)	  and	  evidence	  of	  instability	  in	  one’s	  relevant	  responses.	  	  It	  is	  the	  role	  of	  such	  defeaters	  that	  gives	  sense	  to	  the	  contrast	  between	  the	  ‘objectified’	  idiom:	  “This	  paté	  is	  delicious”	  and	  the	  mere	  report	  of	  one’s	  personal	  affect	  :“I	  like	  this	  paté”	  which	  share	  their	  assertibility	  conditions	  but	  differ	  in	  their	  conditions	  of	  retraction	  —	  both	  withdrawal	  and	  denial.	  	  The	  general	  tenor	  of	  the	  defeaters	  in	  the	  case	  of	  taste	  is	  to	  register	  our	  interest	  in	  stable,	  shareable,	  (morally)	  acceptable	  gustatory	  responses.	  	   The	  foregoing	  is	  just	  an	  illustration,	  and	  a	  sketchy	  one	  at	  that.	  But	  perhaps	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  give	  focus	  to	  the	  challenge	  I	  want	  to	  table.	  Suppose	  we	  are	  given	  a	  refined	  and	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elaborated	  description	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  assertion	  and	  defeat	  that	  are	  characteristic	  of	  the	  signature	  claims	  of	  one	  of	  the	  discourses	  for	  which	  MacFarlane	  is	  proposing	  an	  assessment-­‐sensitive	  semantics.	  Suppose	  we	  are	  also	  given	  a	  plausible	  informal	  theory	  of	  the	  social	  purposes	  characteristically	  served	  by	  a	  discourse	  that	  is	  so	  patterned.	  And	  suppose	  finally	  that	  we	  have	  an	  orthodox	  compositional	  semantic	  theory	  for	  the	  discourse	  .	  Then	  	  what	  further	  legitimate	  explanatory	  ambition	  is	  there,	  so	  far	  unaddressed,	  which	  a	  semantic	  theory	  based	  on	  assessment-­‐sensitivity	  might	  show	  its	  superiority	  by	  accomplishing?	  	   It	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  sketch	  the	  contrast,	  in	  the	  most	  general	  terms,	  between	  the	  relativist	  and	  minimalist	  approaches	  to	  disagreements	  in	  basic	  taste.	  If	  the	  intuitive	  idea	  that	  such	  disagreements	  can	  somehow	  be	  faultless	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  to	  the	  banality	  that	  the	  respective	  opinions	  may	  be	  fully	  justified,	  then	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  idea	  has	  to	  be	  that	  they	  may	  somehow	  reflect	  no	  alethic	  fault.	  	  This	  is,	  naturally,	  a	  hopeless	  idea	  if	  the	  discourse	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  answerable	  to	  a	  single	  norm	  of	  truth	  with	  which	  no	  statement	  and	  its	  negation	  can	  simultaneously	  comply.	  	  So	  if	  faultless	  disagreement	  is	  to	  be	  a	  possibility,	  there	  must	  be	  no	  such	  single	  alethic	  norm.	  	  That	  leaves	  two	  options.	  	  One	  is,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  to—as	  it	  were—fracture	  the	  norm,	  multiply	  the	  ways	  of	  being	  true	  and	  spread	  the	  pieces	  around,	  so	  that	  conflicting	  opinions	  can	  each	  alight	  on	  a	  shard.	  Any	  relativistic	  account	  of	  faultless	  disagreement	  offers	  a	  particular	  implementation	  of	  that	  option.	  	  The	  other	  option	  is	  to	  suction	  out	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  alethic	  norm,	  leaving	  only	  the	  deflated	  residue,	  and	  look	  elsewhere	  for	  the	  substantive	  norms	  that	  operate	  over	  the	  discourse—	  to	  look,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  urged,	  at	  the	  use.	  I	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  strength	  of	  the	  combination	  of	  propositional	  minimalism	  and	  alethic	  pluralism	  defended	  in	  Truth	  and	  Objectivity	  that	  it	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provides	  a	  natural	  setting	  for	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  second	  direction,	  which	  I	  hope	  to	  return	  to	  in	  further	  work.14	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